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THE RELIGION
CLAUSES OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: WHERE
IS THE SUPREME
COURT HEADING?t
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL*

For almost a decade observers have predicted that the Supreme
Court would reconsider its approach to interpreting the religion clauses of
the first amendment. For some, this was an outcome to be feared; for
others, it was to be welcomed. Optimist and pessimist alike, the Court has
repeatedly proven them wrong. Once again, the Court appears on the
verge of change. Maybe this time it will come to pass.
If doctrinal confusion and incoherence are predictors of doctrinal
change, then change is surely on the way. Consider two recent decisions.
According to the Supreme Court, the Constitution permits the State of
Nebraska to hire a Presbyterian minister to deliver official prayers at the
beginning of each meeting of the legislature.' The same Constitution forbids the State of New York from sending public school teachers onto the
premises of an inner city parochial school to teach remedial English and
math to children needing special help.2 It is tempting to imagine that the
Clerk of the Court got the files in these two cases mixed up-that the
Court really meant to say that the state cannot hire legislative chaplains,
but that remedial teachers are unobjectionable. It is equally tempting,
and more realistic, to hope that results such as these will cause the Court
to rethink its position.
It is conceded by most observers, whatever their substantive perspect This Article is adapted from a speech given at the twenty-fourth Annual Meeting of the
Diocesan Attorneys Association of the United States Catholic Conference in Washington,
D.C., April 25, 1988.
* Assistant Professor-of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
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tive, that the present state of Supreme Court doctrine is a muddle. My
intention in this Article is to explore the causes and potential remedies
for this doctrinal confusion. This requires me first to recount the recent
history of twists and turns in religion clause doctrine. This section will
unavoidably contain reflections on cases in which I have participated as
an advocate.3 While I strive to be objective, readers should be alert lest I
fall short of that ideal at times. In the second section I will put forward a
more theoretical explanation for the current doctrinal confusion. The
third section will outline the logical alternatives for resolving that confusion. Finally, in the fourth section I will explore in greater depth the alternative that, to me, holds the greatest promise for religious freedom.

I.

RECENT HISTORY

Ever since the establishment clause was first applied to the activities
of state governments in 1947,' the courts have wavered between two conflicting ideals: separation of church and state, and neutrality toward religion. From the beginning the Court has correctly rejected a third logical
alternative: the claims of the majority for special preferences for their
chosen faith.
The animating metaphor of separationism is the famed "wall of separation between church and state." This metaphor portrays a world divided into two spheres: the private, in which religion is permitted to operate freely, and the governmental, which is to be strictly secular. When the
government is involved in an activity (principally by providing financial
support), any suggestion of religious teaching or endorsement must be
scrupulously avoided. As government assumes a larger share of the responsibility for education and social welfare in the modern world, the result is that those fields-once pluralistic, with significant religious involvement-become, of necessity, secularized.
The ideal of neutrality, by contrast, is that religious institutions and
religiously motivated individuals should be free to participate in government-assisted matters on equal terms with others. Even where government financial assistance is available, private preferences-not a constitutional rule of secularism-should determine the degree of religious
S

Of the cases discussed in this Article, those for which I prepared briefs are Corporation of

Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Witters v. Department of Services for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Estate of Thornton v.
Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); and Tony & Susan
Alamo Foundation v. Donovan, 471 U.S. 290 (1985). I prepared briefs and delivered the oral
argument in Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988); and School District of the City of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). I wrote the brief in opposition to the petition for
certiorari in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
.4 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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involvement. The government must be neutral between religion and secularism, as well as between religions. The way to accomplish this is to treat
all institutions neutrally.
The result of separationism is a secular public sphere; the result of
neutrality is a pluralistic public sphere. The conflict between separation
and neutrality can be seen in the cases involving aid to students attending religiously affiliated private schools. Under the separationist view,
such aid is impermissible, since it involves ("entangles") the government
with religious institutions, and it is difficult to be sure that government
money, when given to religious institutions, does not support religious
teaching. Under the neutrality view, however, such aid is legitimate so
long as all students receive equivalent assistance without regard to which
school they may choose. Oddly enough, the separationist view has come
to prevail in cases involving primary and secondary schools, while the
neutrality view has prevailed in cases involving higher education and
other social welfare activities.
The prevailing Supreme Court "test" for an establishment of religion-the "Lemon" test-attempts a marriage of the two approaches. On
the one hand, the government action is legitimate if its purpose is secular
and its primary effect is neither to "advance[] nor [to] inhibit[ ] religion."5 This seems to embody the neutrality view. On the other hand,
government action is impermissible if it entails an excessive "entanglement" between government and religious institutions.' This seems to be
the separationist view. Since all parts of the test have to be satisfied if
government action is to be sustained, the separationist view has the upper
hand. Indeed, so powerful is the "entanglement" test that the Court has
recently described it as a "Catch-22." '
The mid-1970's were the heyday of separationism, at least as far as
religiously affiliated primary and secondary schools were concerned. In
1973, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,8 the Court held unconstitutional a small tax credit for private
school tuition, and in a long series of cases the Court struck down various
forms of secular in-kind assistance to private school students, including
bus rides on field trips, maps, films, laboratory equipment and other instructional materials, teacher-prepared tests, on-premises therapeutic and
remedial services, and maintenance and repair of school buildings.9 While
formal legal doctrine remained as muddled as ever, the results became
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
Id. at 612.
See Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
s 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
See Garvey, Another Way of Looking at School Aid, 1985 SuP. CT. REv. 61, 67 (chart of
court's decisions in this area).
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predictable: aid to parochial school students, other than transportation
and textbooks, was almost always impermissible.
In the early 1980's, however, the Court began to soften its stance. In
Mueller v. Allen, 10 the Court approved a Minnesota program of tax deductions for educational expenses, including parochial school tuition, on
the ground that the aid is equally available to all families. The Court
downplayed the "entanglement" argument. This came close to a repudiation of the earlier Nyquist decision. Then came Marsh v. Chambers," the
decision upholding the legislative chaplaincy. Whether this case was
rightly or wrongly decided,' it was important in two respects. First, it did
not use the standard Lemon test to determine whether there was an establishment. Second, it relied heavily on historical evidence strongly suggesting that the Lemon test, indeed the entire separationist framework,
was based on an historical mistake. Marsh thus signalled that the Court
was no longer bound to its earlier doctrinal framework.
After Marsh came Lynch v. Donnelly," a difficult case involving the
display of a city-owned nativity scene. Once again, in Lynch the Court
rejected the separationist position, upholding the right of the city to display the creche. In doing so, the majority expressly stated that the Lemon
test was not a binding doctrine 4 and it applied Lemon in a transparently
half-hearted manner. The Court's treatment of Thomas Jefferson's famous "wall of separation" metaphor was symbolic, but indicative. In prior
cases, the Court had used the "wall" to summarize the commands of the
first amendment.'" In Lynch, the Court crisply pointed out that "the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of
the relationship that in fact exists between church and state.""6
Thus, by the summer of 1983, the Supreme Court had apparently
retreated from its separationist posture of the 1970's, and had indicated a
willingness to entertain doctrinal formulations other than the Lemon test.
Mueller, Marsh, and Lynch all pointed in the same direction, but they
contained no hint of a theory or of a doctrine to replace the Lemon test.
During the 1984 Term, the Court agreed to hear an unprecedented number of establishment clause cases, ranging from private employment to
moments of silence to parochial schools. Lawyers in these cases had the
10463 U.S. 388 (1983).
463 U.S. 783 (1983).

12 See McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 362-63 (1988)

(criticism of decision in Marsh).
13 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
" Id. at 679. The court acknowledged that although it has "often found [the Lemon test]
useful . . . [it has) repeatedly emphasized . . . unwillingness to be confined to any single
test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id.
1" See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
1" 465 U.S. at 673.
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opportunity to participate in the development of alternative approaches
to the establishment clause; the briefs, therefore, were forced to go beyond mere precedent to the fundamental history and purposes of the religion clauses.
The decisions that term came as a rude surprise. In Wallace v. Jaffree,1 7 the Court reaffirmed the Lemon test with a vengeance-though
without addressing any of the historical arguments (such as were
presented in Justice Rehnquist's dissent) or theoretical problems (such as
were discussed in Justice O'Connor's concurrence). The Court simply reaffirmed Lemon and returned to the "wall of separation" without explanation."8 And the Court went out of its way to strike down the moment of
silence law in Jaffree on the basis of a strained reading of its peculiar
legislative history, even while conceding, in the abstract, the legitimacy of
moment of silence laws and the lack of any unconstitutional effect. "
The decision in Jaffree was driven home several weeks later by two
of the most extreme and indefensible interpretations of the establishment
0
clause the Court has ever rendered. These were Aguilar v. Felton"
and
"
School District of the City of Grand Rapids v.Ball. These are cases,
mentioned earlier, refusing to allow public school teachers to provide remedial English and math courses to needy parochial school children on
the premises of their own school. Under Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, a cornerstone Great Society program,
federal funds were used to send specially trained public school teachers
on an itinerant basis to schools in low income areas, where they would
work with children with demonstrated educational deficiencies. The statute required all eligible students, public and private, to receive "comparable services." The record demonstrated that the most cost-effective, educationally-effective way to deliver the services was for the students to
receive them within their own school. (To transport the students to "neutral" sites would cost the students valuable instructional time and would
increase program costs by about one third.)
The Supreme Court held this program to be an establishment of religion, largely on the theory that the atmosphere of parochial schools might
induce the teachers to introduce some elements of religious doctrine into
their courses.22 To state the Court's theory is to refute it. The record re472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 57-61; see also id. at 62-66 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 73-79 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 42-50 (criticizing
Jaffree decision).
'8

20

473 U.S. 402 (1985).

473 U.S. 373 (1985).
See id. at 388. The Court explained that "[tleachers in such an atmosphere may well
subtly (or overtly) conform their instruction to the environment in which they teach, while
2'

"
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futed it as well: nineteen years of operation in New York City-reputed
to be a diverse and contentious community-produced not one instance,
or even complaint, of any teacher or student mixing religion with the Title I program. Aguilar and Grand Rapids are decisions with no winners,
only losers. Their effect is that needy children will receive remedial help
in a far less effective way, at much greater cost. The parochial school children suffer; the taxpayer suffers; even the public school children suffer,
since the increased cost of the less effective program will be shared among
all participants."
In another decision the same term, the Court voted overwhelmingly
to strike down a Connecticut statute that protected the right of workers
who observe a sabbath to designate that as their day off.24 The law replaced a prior Sunday Closing law, which had been upheld by the courts,
but which protected only the rights of the mainstream of the Christian
majority. It is difficult to see how broadening the protection to those who
observe a sabbath other than Sunday, while freeing up those who observe
no sabbath at all to choose days other than Sunday, could be thought
more of an establishment than the prior law. More fundamentally, the
decision created doubts about the constitutionality of a variety of state
efforts to protect free exercise in the context of the workplace.
The 1984 Term thus ended on a discouraging note. Since then, however, the Court has rendered three decisions that strike a quite different
tone. In 1986, the Court unanimously held-in Witters v. Department of
Services for the Blind 2 -that it did not violate the establishment clause
for a state to pay the tuition of a student for the ministry at an institution called the Inland Empire School of the Bible. After Aguilar and
Grand Rapids, this result may seem impossible. How can the state pay
the tuition for a ministerial candidate at a Bible college, when it cannot
pay the salary of a public school specialist to teach remedial English and
math to disadvantaged parochial school children?
If Aguilar and Grand Rapids represented separationism taken to the
extreme, Witters represented a turn back toward neutrality. In Witters,
the State offered to pay tuition to certain categories of disabled individustudents will perceive the instruction provided in the context of the dominantly religious
message of the institution, thus reinforcing the indoctrinating effect." Id.; accord Aguilar,
473 U.S. at 409 (intrusive monitoring required to "prevent[] the Title I program from being
used, intentionally or unwittingly, to inculcate the religious beliefs of the surrounding parochial school").
23 See McConnell, Remedial Education Programsfor Private School Children:
Judicial Developments and Future Prospects, in THE CHURCH, THE STATE AND THE SCHOOLS 19 (C.
Vergon ed. 1986).
24 See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); McConnell,
supra note 19, at
50-58 (criticizing Thornton decision).
25 474 U.S. 481
(1986).
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als for any course of study leading to a job. Witters was blind and wanted
to study for the ministry. The program was so obviously neutral that the
Court subordinated its usual separationist posture. The "program is
'made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited,' and is in no way
skewed toward religion," explained Justice Thurgood Marshall for the
Court majority.26 Why that principle did not apply equally in Aguilar and
Grand Rapids went unexplained. Witters is a hopeful decision because it
placed the focus squarely where it ought to be: on how a program affects
the religious choice of the individuals involved, rather than on whether
there is an "entanglement" between church and governmental
bureaucracies.
Witters was followed by yet another unanimous decision-and unanimous decisions in this area are exceedingly rare. In this case, Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos,2 7 the Court upheld a federal statute
exempting religious organizations from laws forbidding discrimination on
the basis of religion. Under the exemption, churches are able to staff their
noncommercial operations with members of their own faith. Two points
about Amos deserve attention. First, it is the first Supreme Court decision to uphold a statute singling out religious organizations for protection
from government regulation. It thus goes beyond mere facial neutrality,
28
to an affirmative accommodation of religious autonomy.
Second, the decision showed unusual sensitivity to the way in which
apparently nonreligious aspects of church operations can have a religious
dimension. The case involved a building superintendent in a gym owned
by the Mormon Church, who was no longer a member in good standing of
the Church. The superintendent was fired; he sued. The district court
refused to allow the statutory exemption, on the ground that the job was
wholly secular, no different from the job of a janitor in a for-profit health
facility. The Supreme Court, in contrast, recognized that a church's social
welfare mission may be linked to its religious mission in ways that are not
apparent to an outsider. To the Court, the real threat to religious freedom
was not the exemption, but the notion that the government has the right
to decide which aspects of a church's operations are related to its religious mission and which are not. Amos was therefore a major victory for
religious autonomy.
Still more recent is Bowen v. Kendrick,2 9 a decision of potentially
far-reaching importance. The question in Bowen was whether religiously21 Id. at 487-88 (citation omitted).
'- 483 U.S. 327 (1987).

" See McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L.

McConnell, supra note 19, at 27-28.
29 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).

REV.

146 (1986);
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affiliated organizations may participate in a federally-funded program to
encourage innovative services to deal with the problem of adolescent
pregnancy. The program, authorized by the Adolescent Family Life Act,
funds projects started by public and private groups to provide housing,
nutritional care, health services, adoption counseling, and related services
to pregnant adolescents, and-more controversially-to encourage sexual
self-discipline. Opponents of the program claimed that these matters are
so close to religious issues that allowing religiously-affiliated organizations
to participate amounts to funding the teaching of religious doctrine. The
lower court agreed, and issued an injunction barring any religiously-affiliated organization from involvement in the program.
The implications of Bowen went far beyond the relatively minor Adolescent Family Life Act. The wider question was whether the Court
would apply the secularist model of church-state separation, heretofore
confined almost exclusively to cases involving elementary and secondary
education, to other social welfare activities. Under the lower court's theory, religiously-affiliated organizations would be barred from participating
in publicly-funded, privately-administered programs, involving tens of
billions of dollars, at least insofar as those programs were related to the
religious mission of the organizations. But it is difficult to conceive of a
social welfare activity in which religious organizations are involved (feeding the hungry, housing the homeless, healing the sick, assisting the alien,
caring for the widow and the orphan) that is not based on their fundamental theological commitment and that could not, at least in theory, be
the vehicle for spreading religious teachings and values. Thus, the theory,
if it had been accepted by the Supreme Court, would have marked a dramatic shift toward the secular, and away from the pluralistic, model of
social welfare services in this country.
The Supreme Court's decision emphatically rejected the lower court's
approach, insisting that any exclusion of an otherwise qualified religious
grantee from a government grant program must be based on actual proof
that funds were used for a "specifically religious" activity. 30 The Court
provided little guidance on what this restriction may entail. Is it confined
to overt religious teaching-something that is likely to prove exceedingly
rare? Or is it equivalent to a requirement of total secularization? However this question may be resolved, the decision represents a major shift
away from the rigid separationism of Aguilar and Grand Rapids towards
a more neutral posture toward religion.
"0Id. at 2580-81. The Court also held that "pervasively sectarian" grantees must be barred
from the program. Id. at 2580 n.16. These are organizations whose sectarian purpose is so
"inextricably intertwined" with its secular activities that the two cannot be distinguished.
Id. Two members of the Court criticized this aspect of the holding. See id. at 2582 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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In particular, the Bowen decision solidifies the distinction between
elementary and secondary schools, on the one hand, and other government-assisted social welfare activity, on the other. Even the four dissenters were forced to distinguish government assistance to religious providers of social welfare services, such as "running a soup kitchen or a
hospital. "' 1 Bowen thus calls a halt to the previously growing tendency to
extend the separationist logic of the parochial school cases to the wider
universe, in which church-state interaction has been the norm, and indicates we have seen the high-water mark of separationism.
It does not, however, resolve the doctrinal confusion. The Court has
offered no satisfactory explanation why it applies a rigorous separationist
test to government programs involving elementary and secondary education, a relaxed test to other social welfare activities, and a standard of
simple neutrality to cases like Witters. It has left in place Lemon's incoherent mixture of neutrality and separation. Some observers will applaud
Aguilar and excoriate Bowen; others will applaud Bowen and excoriate
Aguilar; others might disagree with both decisions. But I doubt that any
reasonable observer could conclude that both decisions were correct-or
could even offer a plausible justification that could explain both results.
II.

THE REASON FOR DOCTRINAL CONFUSION

No one would suggest that the Justices have created the religion
clauses muddle because they are unintelligent, or because they have devoted insufficient attention to the problem. Rather, there has been a fundamental mistake at the most basic level about the relationship between
the free exercise and establishment clauses. The mistake arose, historically, from looking at the two clauses in isolation and giving them a different cast. Since then, the Court has worked out the logical implications
of the divergent interpretations, to the point that today the clauses are
read as if they meant opposite things-not simply that there is a "tension" between free exercise and establishment, which the Court has frequently stated, but that the two clauses of the first amendment are essentially at war with one another.
What does the free exercise clause mean today? According to the
Court, it means that the government may not impose a burden on religious practice unless it has a compelling justification, and no less restrictive means, for doing so." In the leading case, Sherbert v. Verner," a

31

I at 2591 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 530 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)

(government must show unusually important interest at stake and that requested exemption
will result in substantial harm to such interest); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58
(1982) (state may limit religious liberty if essential to accomplish overriding governmental
interest); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (state can justifiably invade reli-
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Seventh Day Adventist working in the textile mills lost her job when the
industry went on a six-day work week (remaining closed on Sundays).
Under the free exercise clause, she was constitutionally entitled to unemployment compensation. In a similar case, the Court held that the State
must pay unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job
in an armaments factory because of his religious pacifist principles.3" The
Court reasoned that denial of the benefit would be a burden on free exercise, since it would force the worker to choose between violating a tenet of
his or her faith, and being eligible for unemployment compensation.3 5
It is important to stress that state law in these cases would not have
provided benefits to workers who quit because of nonreligious reasons
however strong or conscientious those reasons might be. If Mrs. Sherbert
had quit because she had to take care of an elderly parent on Saturdays,
she would have lost her benefits; if the worker in the armaments factory
had quit because of political conviction, he would have had no redress.
Under the free exercise clause, religiously motivated conduct is protected
and nonreligious conduct is not.
To show how the two religion clauses are now read as opposite to one
another, imagine that Sherbert v. Verner was an establishment clause
case instead of a free exercise case. Imagine that Mrs. Sherbert's state
had enacted an unemployment compensation program that provides benefits to persons who are unemployed because of religious scruples, but not
because of nonreligious scruples. Is it not perfectly clear that this statute
has both the purpose and the effect of advancing religion, and is thus
unconstitutional under the Lemon test? If the worker has a religious objection to working he gets the benefit; if he has a nonreligious objection
he is denied the benefit. That is almost like rewarding religious faith and
penalizing nonreligion. If the result in Sherbert were a statute challenged
under the Lemon test, it would clearly be struck down.
Imagine, also, that Aguilar and Grand Rapids were free exercise
cases instead of establishment cases. Imagine that some benighted state
passes a statute providing that remedial help will be given to poor, educationally deprived children on the premises of their school, with the following proviso: "provided, however, that no such help may be provided to
children who have chosen to attend religiously-affiliated schools." If a
gious liberty only by showing it is "least restrictive means of achieving some compelling
state interest").
.3 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
" See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720; see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480
U.S. 136 (1987) (unemployment compensation for discharge on account of religious belief
adopted after beginning employment).
11 See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719. The merits of this claim are considered in detail in McConnell & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Issues Arising Under the Religion Clauses, 56 U.
CH. L. REv. (1988) (forthcoming).
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child's family chooses a secular school, public or private, the child receives the benefit of on-premises remedial education; if the family chooses
a religious school, the benefit is denied. Is it not perfectly clear that this
hypothetical statute violates the free exercise clause, as interpreted in
Sherbert v. Verner? It in effect amounts to a tax on the exercise of the
constitutional right to attend a religious school. It puts families to the
cruel choice between needed remedial services and following the dictates
of their faith.
This is more than evidence of "tension" between the clauses. What
the free exercise clause requires the establishment clause forbids, and vice
versa.- This helps to explain the Court's doctrinal confusion: it is using
legal constructs that are -internally inconsistent.
III.

RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CLAUSES

There are three logical alternative ways to reduce or eliminate the
conflict the Supreme Court has created between the free exercise and establishment clauses. Each has its advocates on the Supreme Court.
First, the Court might leave its establishment doctrine intact and retreat on the free exercise front. This might be called the "secularist" position, since it would guarantee exclusion of religious elements from public
benefits, without protecting religious activity from the consequences of
public burdens. The result would be to raise the cost of religious activity
and reduce its scope. Justice John Paul Stevens is the leading exponent
of this view. He is one of the most candid advocates of the "no aid" approach to the establishment clause, and has stated that his view of the
free exercise clause leaves "virtually no room for a 'constitutionally required exemption' on religious grounds from a valid . . . law that is entirely neutral in its general application.""
For example, in Goldman v. Weinberger,3 7 an Orthodox Jew was expelled from the military because of his inability to comply with a facially
neutral rule forbidding military personnel from wearing non-uniform
headgear. He filed suit, claiming that he was entitled under the free exercise clause to an exception that would permit him to wear the yarmulke
required by his faith. Justice Stevens agreed that the requested exemption would "create[] almost no danger of impairment of the Air Force's
military mission," 8 but nonetheless voted to deny the free exercise claim.
In his view, as explained in an earlier opinion, the government has an
"overriding interest" in keeping "out of the business of evaluating the

" Lee,

455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"7 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
38 Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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relative merits of differing religious claims.""
There is no danger of a clash between free exercise and establishment under the secularist view, since the establishment clause is all-powerful and the free exercise clause has little application.
Second, the Court might adopt a posture of "judicial restraint" toward both clauses. This view, which is followed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Byron White, tends to defer to invocations of governmental interests and to reject challenges to governmental action, whether
based on free exercise or on establishment. Rehnquist, for example, dissented in both the unemployment compensation cases and in Aguilar v.
Felton. Adoption of this view would eliminate conflict between the religion clauses by granting far more latitude to representative institutions,
both to extend assistance to religious organizations and to impose incidental burdens on religion. This would help religion in some ways, and
hurt it in others.
Third, the Court might adopt a posture of "accommodation" to religion. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor is the closest to this view on the present Court-though Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy could
prove sympathetic as well. This view would require the Court to modify
its separationist posture toward the establishment clause, while retaining
its free exercise jurisprudence in full vigor. The result would be a more
diverse and pluralistic society, since religion would receive neutral treatment under the establishment clause and minority religious preferences
would receive special protection under the free exercise clause.
There is, of course, a fourth logical possibility: to retain the status
quo. The establishment clause could continue to be read as meaning the
opposite of the free exercise clause. This view has powerful adherents:
Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, and Harry Blackmun, as well as the ACLU, the American Jewish Congress, and other private organizations. If this position prevails, the Court's decisions can be
expected to remain confused, inconsistent, and unpredictable.

IV. A

UNIFIED THEORY OF RELIGIOUS CHOICE

The accommodationist option, limned above, offers the possibility of
a unified theory of religious choice. The two religion clauses can be understood as complementary provisions guaranteeing that government action
be conducted, as much as possible, so as to reduce effects on religious
choice. The free exercise clause prevents the government from influencing
religious choice by creating disincentives to religious alternatives, and the
establishment clause prevents the government from influencing religious
choice by creating positive incentives to religious alternatives. While
'9

See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982).
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government action inevitably will affect religious choice to some degree-even a decision to increase welfare payments, or to go to war, will
do that-the first amendment requires that those effects be minimized.
Effects on religious choice can be permitted only if demoAstrably needed
to achieve public purposes unrelated to the encouragement or suppression
of religion; religious institutions and religiously motivated conduct may
be treated differently only if it is necessary to reduce effects of government policy on religious choice or to achieve public purposes unrelated to
religion.
There is both an individual and an institutional dimension to this
unified theory of religious choice. At the individual level, it would guarantee that decisions about, questions of faith and religious practice will be
left to the individual conscience, in contrast to the present latitude for
government inhibition of religion. This would require modifications in
both free exercise and establishment jurisprudence.
Free exercise decisions in the modern era are almost uniformly disappointing to religious claimants. Indeed, since 1970, the Supreme Court
has rejected every free exercise claim that has been presented, with the
single exception of claims for unemployment compensation, which are
governed by clear precedent dating back to 1963. A major reason for the
Court's reluctance to uphold free exercise claims is the unarticulated assumption that free exercise exceptions constitute "special benefits" for
religion, which violate the spirit of the establishment clause. The accommodationist position, however, teaches that free exercise claims are consistent with a wider theory of neutrality: the religion clauses are a systematic prohibition of government action that distorts religious choice,
whether for it or against it. When an Orthodox Jew is excused from the
military's no-headgear rule or a Seventh Day Adventist is excused from
the requirement of availability for work on Saturday, they are not being
given special favors. Rather, they are exempted from government-generated pressure to abandon the dictates of their religious faith. This is neutrality of the most fundamental sort, since it prevents the power of the
state from being used, even unintentionally, to inhibit the free exercise of
religion.
The protection of individual exercise of religious conscience also requires a reinterpretation of the establishment clause. For individuals to
exercise religious choice requires a pluralistic society. If government taxing and spending is systematically skewed in favor of secular institutions,
that pluralism is in danger. Families who wish to take advantage of Adolescent Family Life Act programs for their teenage children are able,
thanks to the Bowen decision, to choose from among service providers,
some of which are secular and some of which are religious. If separationist
opponents of the Act had their way, the religious alternatives would have
been eliminated. By contrast, due to the Grand Rapids and Aguilar deci-
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sions, poor families who wish to educate their children in a religious environment can do so only at the cost of forfeiting their right to on-premises
remedial education. This is a heavy price to pay. The establishment
clause, no less than the free exercise clause, can serve as a guarantor of
religious choice, but only if separationism gives way to neutrality. Government should leave the choice to the individual by extending its benefits equally to the religious and nonreligious segments of the educational
and social welfare field. It should not be required to exclude religious
alternatives.
The institutional dimension of religious liberty is also important. The
ideal of religious autonomy does not exist in our constitutional scheme
solely for the protection of individual conscience, important though it is.
It is a happy coincidence that the protection of individual choice in religious matters will also preserve one of the essential preconditions to the
maintenance of a democratic republic such as ours. One of the key features of our system is that it recognizes the importance and the autonomy
of voluntary associations larger than the individual, but independent of
the state. Neighborhoods, colleges and universities, families, labor unions,
and clubs offer opportunities for individuals to gather together in a communitarian way to order their lives. These associations can be a source of
thinking different from, and at times in opposition to, majoritarian ideals
that dominate the government. They can call the government's principles
and decisions into question; they can keep alive alternative ways of
thought; they can generate and transmit principles and beliefs that challenge the orthodoxies of society.'
At a constitutional level, perhaps the best recognized of such associations is the press. Newspapers are sometimes called "the Fourth Estate,"
for the reason that their power to question governmental acts, to stimulate public attention to an agenda different from that of the officials in
power, and to organize public opinion by persuasion makes them powerful political actors. Freedom of the press is granted not just (or even primarily) out of respect for the rights of the publisher, but because of the
public function that is performed by an independent press. Press freedom
contributes to the diffusion of power, and thus to the preservation of republican liberty.
First amendment protections for religious freedom have a similar institutional dimension. Religious autonomy is not unlike freedom of the
press. Churches, like the press, are able to command the attention of portions of the public; they can take positions at odds with social orthodoxy;
they can organize public opinion. For much the same reasons that under'0 See generally P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING
STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 26-33 (1977).
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lie the newspapers' status as "the Fourth Estate," Tocqueville described
religion as "the first of [America's] political institutions."'1 The political
importance of churches is even more evident on the world scene. In many
countries (Poland, South Africa, and Nicaragua come immediately to
mind) the church is virtually the only institution strong enough to stand
up to the state. Traditions of church autonomy thus constitute one of the
last protections against the all-powerful state.
The interpretation of the religion clauses as a guarantee of religious
choice furthers this institutional autonomy. The free exercise clause,
properly interpreted, prohibits the government from forcing churches to
conform to prevailing political norms, whether it is the Jim Crow laws
that were forced on Christian colleges like Berea in Kentucky in the last
century,"' or acceptance of homosexuality as an alternative lifestyle, as is
forced on Georgetown University in our day."3 Churches should be allowed to follow their own lights in matters of doctrine and organization,
lest their vital role as counters to governmental power be sacrificed. This
means that church teachings must on occasion be tolerated even when
they are abhorrent, like the racial doctrines of a Bob Jones University.""
Liberty is not limited to things that matter little.
The establishment clause, too, has a part to play in the protection of
the institutional autonomy of religious organizations. If religious autonomy is important, we must not allow the demands of the welfare state to
result in a forced secularization of the social welfare field. We must
strengthen and preserve elements in our system that promote diversity
and the independent-and distinctive-character of religious associations. To force religious organizations to secularize their missions, at the
risk of exclusion from public programs, would be a major step toward
neutralizing the church as an independent voice.
Prevailing misconceptions of the religion clauses-misconceptions
that would force religious voices to the margins of public life-are thus
inimical to the constitutional vision of independent churches (along with
other independent voluntary associations) in a pluralistic society. To return to this constitutional vision requires a reorientation of first amendment doctrine, away from secularism and separation, and toward religious
choice as a unified interpretation of both free exercise and establishment.
" See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 292 (Anchor Books ed. 1969).
4 See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
" See Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc). An
attempt to overrule this case by an act of Congress has been ruled unconstitutional. For an
interesting discussion of the deep intrusion on religious liberty presented by the Georgetown
case, see Comment, Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, Failure to Recognize a
Catholic University's Religious Liberty, 32 CATH. LAW. 170 (1988).
" See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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If one has any faith in the persuasive power of the constitutional vision,
this must be the direction the Supreme Court is heading-if not now,
then some day.

